We analyze a recent paper in which an alleged devastating criticism to the so called GRW proposal to account for the objectification of the properties of macroscopic systems has been presented and we show that the author has not taken into account the precise implications of the GRW theory. This fact makes his conclusions basically wrong. We also perform a survey of measurement theory aimed to better focus the physical and the conceptual aspects of the so-called macro-objectification problem.
Introduction
Recently, a paper [1] , hereafter referred to as PJL, has been published in which an alleged crucial criticism of the so called GRW theory [2] has been presented. The basic claim of the paper, which echoes some previous analogous criticisms [3] but puts forward new arguments and pretends to derive much more drastic conclusions, is that the occurrence of the so-called "tails" of the wavefunctions describing ordinary macroscopic objects within the GRW theory, implies that arithmetic does not apply to such objects. As a consequence it is argued that the GRW approach does not represent an acceptable way out from the difficulties of Standard Quantum Mechanics (SQM).
As we will prove in this paper, PJL fails in taking into account the precise implications of the GRW theory. This makes all his analysis not only physically irrelevant, but conceptually incorrect. After having made clear this point in Sections 3 and 4, we will devote the following Sections to revisiting some aspects of the measurement problem. This seems appropriate because the analysis of the author, among other things, involves a misleading mixing up of the real "measurement problem of SQM" with the much more general (but universally considered as not puzzling) problem of the description, within a genuine Hilbert space formalism, of the continuous degrees of freedom of macroscopic systems. Finally, we will point out that some well known and mathematically rigorous results show that the author's requests cannot be satisfied by almost all measurement processes. 2 The argument of PJL.
The initial remark of ref. [1] is that according to standard quantum mechanical dogma mutually exclusive states of affairs must be associated to orthogonal vectors, while, within dynamical reduction schemes like the GRW theory, one is unavoidably led to release such a request for the states of the apparatus corresponding to different outcomes. We plainly recognize that the above statement is correct. In fact, we all know that the negation of a statement concerning the properties possessed by an individual quantum system must be represented, within quantum formalism, by orthocomplementation in the Hilbert space. We also agree on the fact that in GRW-like theories the role of the tails of the wavefunctions is essential to guarantee the desired physical implications of such models [4] , and that the presence of the tails forbids mutually alternative measurement outcomes being perfectly correlated to orthogonal states.
However, as we will prove, the above remark does not allow to draw the conclusions of ref [1] that the GRW point of view leads to contradictions in dealing with the problem of counting a large number of macroscopic marbles in a certain space region (and thus it would clash with the principles of arithmetic). In fact, the central (and, in the author's opinion, fatal) argument of Section 4 of the paper, turns out to be wrong due to the fact that the author has not taken into account the precise physical implications of the GRW dynamics. Let us recall the argument of ref. [1] . The author considers a composite system made up of n macroscopic noninteracting marbles, each of which is in a state of the type of those characterizing macroscopic states within the GRW theory:
with |a| 2 ≫ |b| 2 = 0, |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1. The states |in i and |out i correspond to wavefunctions having their support strictly within an extremely large "box" B, and strictly outside it, respectively. The box is supposed to be so large that the various indices i correspond to locations of the marbles so far from each other that (in the author's words) we can keep their interactions as small as we like.
Then, according to PJL, the difficulty that the GRW approach meets and which should be fatal for it can be easily exhibited:
1. The GRW theory asserts that when the i-th particle is in the state (1) "it counts as being within the box".
2. Since all n particles are in a state of this kind, one can claim: "particle 1 is within the box, particle 2 is within the box, ..., particle n is within the box". But, if arithmetic is true, i.e., if the enumeration principle holds, this amounts to claim that all particles are in the box.
3. On the other hand, the state of the composite system is:
4. For such a state quantum mechanics predicts that the probability of finding all particles within the box in a measurement is given by the square of the modulus of the coefficient of the term |in 1 ⊗ |in 2 ⊗ . . . otimes|in n in the above equation, i.e. by the quantity |a| 2n . Now, since |a| 2 , even though it is extremely close to 1 is actually smaller than 1, for sufficiently large n such a probability becomes appreciably smaller than one; actually, it tends to zero for n tending to infinity.
5.
The inconsistency should now be evident: the GRW's claim that when the state of the i-th particle is (1) the particle is within the box and the assumption that the enumeration principle of arithmetic holds lead to the assertion "all particles are in the box", while the outcome of an experiment will (almost) surely contradict such a statement. The conclusion follows: accepting GRW requires abandoning arithmetic.
3 Taking into account the physical implications of the GRW dynamics.
In this Section we will show that above argument is basically incorrect. This can be easily proved by investigating in greater detail the physical implications of the "crucial" state (2), the one which, in the author's opinion, leads to a contradiction between the GRW position and the validity of the enumeration principle 1 . The crucial point is that the author has not taken into account what the GRW theory entails for a state like (2) . To develope our proof, let us begin by rewriting this state:
and let us express it as the linear superposition of the states obtained by performing explicity the product of the various factors appearing in it. We get an extremely long succession of terms, all with extremely small coefficients: a n |in 1 ⊗ |in 2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |in n + a n−1 b|out 1 ⊗ |in 2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |in n +a n−1 b|in 1 ⊗ |out 2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |in n + . . . + a n−1 b|in 1 ⊗ |in 2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |out n (4)
With reference to this expression one has to take into account two fundamental facts:
i) Any pair of terms in (4) corresponds to different locations of at least one marble: in the first term all marbles are within the box and in different positions (so as to guarantee that their interactions are as small as we like), in the second term marble number 1 is outside the box, and so on for the remaining states.
ii) The marbles are macroscopic objects, and, as such, they contain a number of particles of the order of Avogadro's number. But it is the most fundamental physical characteristic of the GRW theory that it forbids the persistence of superpositions of states of this kind. In particular for the case under consideration the precise GRW dynamics will lead in about one millionth of a second to the suppression of the superposition and to the "spontaneous reduction" of the state (4) to one of its terms (with the probability attached to it by its specific coefficient). Thus, the difficulty arising, according to PJL, in connection with a state like (4) does not present itself for the simple reason that such a state never occurs, its existence being forbidden by the GRW theory itself. Accordingly, the statement that the GRW approach leads to claim that such a state describes the situation in which "precisely n particles are within the box" is nonsensical for the very simple reason that such a state is not a possible state for the considered physical system of n marbles.
Summarizing, the situation that PJL envisages to show that the dynamical reduction program meets extremely serious difficulties, involves a state which, according to the theory he is criticizing, cannot occur and, even if it would occur at a given instant, it would be transformed immediately into a pefectly reasonable (from the point of view of the enumeration principle) state in which an absolutely precise number of marbles is within the box. Obviously, there is a non-zero probability that this number be different from n, but this is totally irrelevant: the GRW theory, while claiming that a marble in the state (1) can be asserted "to be within the box", due to its basic dynamical features has precise physical implications which PJL seems to ignore concerning hypothetical situations in which more than one marble is in such a state 2 When these implications are correctly taken into account it emerges clearly that it is meaningless to make any statement about the location of the marbles in such states simply because they cannot persist for [6] "more than a split second". Actually, even in the case of only two marbles the theory implies that it is nonsensical to consider a state like:
and, to grasp its physical implications, requires to make reference to the non puzzling terms of the expression:
one of which becomes immediately (i.e. within 10 −6 -10 −7 sec.) the one describing the actual physical situation.
The above analysis shows that the criticism of PJL is devoid of any sense 3
A quantitative analysis.
With reference to the just discussed aspect of the theory which implies that a state like (3) is transformed "in a split second" into one of the terms of its expression (4), we consider it illuminating to take precisely into account the details of the GRW dynamics to evaluate the various possible outcomes of the spontaneous reduction process. To this purpose let us recall that in ref. [5] consideration has been given to a system which is initially in the less localized situation (from the point of view of the present analysis) which can occur, i.e. in the state:
we are seeing a consensus being reached, which cuts across several rival approaches, on how to handle the problem of aligning macroscopic with microscopic descriptions. This is to say that such reports as that a real measurement had a certain outcome, that the pointer was at the 7 for instance, are not to be equated with statements to the effect that a certain specific observable had a specific value (or that a certain vector was an eigenvector of a specific observable) but rather with something else which -some vagueness apart -can still be described in quantum mechanical terms. ... I will explain below why I see this as part of a consensus with discussions about other interpretations of quantum mechanics. But there is this difference: that you have given, in your discussion of appropriate and inappropriate topologies, an important and even (to my mind) very convincing rationale for this solution. It is conforting for us that a philosopher deeply involved in the foundational issues of quantum mechanics sees in our analysis a very convincing rationale for abandoning the requirement of strict orthogonality of the final states of the apparatuses and not a reason to claim that this makes the GRW proposal to conflict with basic requirements of arithmetic. 3 We stress that, even though we have chosen to develop our argument with reference to the simplified GRW version of the spontaneous localization mechanism, precisely the same argument holds for the continuous versions of dynamical reduction models, in particular CSL, which take into account the identity of the constituents. In such models, as discussed in great detail in ref. [7] , instead of speaking of the number of particles and of their almost precise locations one should make reference to the appropriately averaged local mass density at all points of ordinary space.
and it has been proved that after a time t of the order of the perception time (i.e. 10 −2 -10 −3 sec) it is dynamically transformed by the universal GRW evolution equation in a state like (1) . Moreover, in the case of a macroscopic system, a rigorous realistic explicit estimate of the quantities |a| 2 and |b| 2 , after the above time has elapsed, has been given. The argument of ref. [5] implies that, in the case of a macroscopic body of normal density and with a volume of one cubic centimeter (i.e. for a system like the marbles of PJL) one has, after the considered time:
Let us then take once more into consideration the state (3), let us define the operator which counts the particles in the box and let us evaluate explicitly the probability P (N in = n|Ψ all ) that, as a consequence of the reduction process which it suffers almost immediately, it is transformed into the first term of Eq. (4), i.e. in the state corresponding to the property "all n particles are within the box". Such a probability is given by:
This equation implies that the probability P (N in = n|Ψ all ) that the reduction process leads to any other state appearing in (4) is:
We choose now a positive number τ appreciably smaller than 1 and we determine for which value of n the probability P (N in = n|Ψ all ) takes a value larger than τ . We have:
i.e.:
This equation amounts to:
which, by taking into account that and are extremely small, gives n > τ |b| 2 , i.e. τ < n|b| 2 .
Eq. (14) has some extremely interesting implications:
-Let us suppose that the number of marbles we want to consider is so large that their mass equals the mass of the whole universe, which, as is well known, is of the order of 10 53 gr. Assuming that a marble has a mass of the order of 1 gr, n turns out to be of the order of 10 53 . Taking into account the value (8) and Eq. (14) we get:
τ ≤ 10 53 · 10 −(10 15 ) ∼ = 10 −(10 15 ) .
The conclusion is then obvious: even if one were able (but the theory makes this practically impossible) to prepare at a given instant a state like (1) for which n is so large that one must use the mass of the whole universe to build the marbles which appear in it, it would immediately collapse onto one of its terms and the probability that this term corresponds to a number of particles in the box different in any way whatsoever from n is smaller than 10 −(10 15 ) .
We do not want to be misunderstood: we know very well that one cannot call into play the smallness of the probability of a certain occurrence to avoid a mathematical contradiction. But the purpose of the above calculation is not that of escaping from a contradiction. As it should be perfectly clear to everybody who has followed us, no logical problem arises from the possibility that the reduction leads to any state of Eq.(4) different from its first term. We have presented the explicit evaluation of the probabilities of the various reductions simply to make clear to the reader the actual physical orders of magnitude which govern which one of the potential states of (4) is actualized by the GRW mechanism and that such a state is (almost) certainly the one corresponding to n particles being within the box. 5 The orthogonality requirement for the final states in a measurement process.
We consider it appropriate to devote the second part of this paper to critically analyze the requirement that the final apparatus states, after the measurement process is over, be strictly orthogonal. This will allow us to focus on the difference between the "quantum measurement problem" and the problem of describing the continuous degrees of freedom of a macroscopic object.
General considerations.
We begin by pointing out that the problem which is raised by the appearance of the tails in theories of the GRW-type has very little to do with the so-called "measurement problem of SQM" but instead it is strictly related to another relevant problem, i.e. the one of describing, within a genuine Hilbert space formalism (i.e. without resorting to some kind of hidden variables), a physical system having a definite location. To see this we can start by recalling that von Neumann, in his fundamental attempt to account in a mathematically precise way for the measurement problem, has considered an idealized situation in which a microsystem S, in one, let us say |ω j , of the proper eigenstates of a self-adjoint operatorΩ corresponding to the physical observable O we are interested in, interacts with a macroscopic apparatus A in a "ready to measure" state |A 0 and has hypothesized a precise dynamics governing the S-A interaction leading to the evolution:
The states |A j , i.e. those accounting for the amplification from the "unaccessible" microworld to the world of our definite perceptions, are assumed to satisfy:
Such relations are obviously necessary if one wants to infer with absolute precision, from a subsequent measurement on the apparatus, the property referring to the observable O which is possessed by the microsystem. In fact, would the scalar product A k |A j be different from zero for k = j , one would not be allowed to deduce from the outcome a k of the test he performs on the apparatus that the system has been found in the state |ω k in the measurement: actually, it could have been found in the state |ω j .
Let us now suppose that all previous assumptions about the measurement process are satisfied. Then one can formulate in a simple way the so called measurement problem: since the system S can be (in general) easily prepared in a linear superposition of the states |ω k :
Eqs. (16) and the natural assumption that the linear evolution of SQM governs all physical processes, imply:
But then: what meaning can be attached to a final statevector like the one at the r.h.s. of Eq.(19) in which states corresponding to different macroscopic situations of the apparatus appear?
In our opinion it is of remarkable relevance to stress that both in the specific theoretical models of measurement processes worked out by von Neumann himself [8] as well as in practically all actual experimental situations, one is led to consider the states |A j as referring (according to the index which characterizes them) to different possible spatial locations of a macroscopic object (the pointer of the apparatus). This remark actually makes more striking (as repeatedly stressed by Schrödinger [9] and Einstein [10] , among many others) the embarrassment with a state like (19): how can a macroscopic system be in a superposition of states corresponding to its being located in macroscopically different spatial regions? The situation is so puzzling that SQM has tried to circumvent it by adopting the point of view that J.S. Bell has appropriately characterized [5] as the assumption that Schrödinger's equation is not always right: in the considered process, since a macroscopic system enters into play, the linear and deterministic Q-evolution breaks down, the nonlinear and stochastic process of wave packet reduction (WPR) occurs, and the final state reduces to one of the terms of the sum at the r.h.s. of (19), with probability |c k | 2 . The GRW theory gets this result by assuming, in place of an ill defined postulate (WPR) which contradicts the basic principles of the theory, that the dynamics of SQM has to be modified in such a way that one can derive the desired behaviour from a unified dynamical law governing all physical processes, from the microscopic to the macroscopic scale. Such a procedure has been proved to be viable but it requires two precise moves:
-One must take extremely seriously the idea that the information we can get about the states of a microsystem must be correlated to the position (or better, in the more sophisticated versions of dynamical reduction models [5] , to the appropriately averaged mass distribution) of some macroscopic system.
-One must be satisfied with the fact that the final statevectors |A j which are brought in by the modified dynamics are almost, but not exactly, orthogonal. To prepare the basis for the detailed analysis of the next subsection, let us consider the simplified version of Eq.(19) in which only two microscopic states appear, let us disregard the internal variables of the apparatus and let us assume that, for the purposes we are interested in, the apparatus itself is adequately described by a one dimensional configuration variable X to be identified with the coordinate of its centre of mass. Then, denoting as Ψ k (X) = X|A k , k = 1, 2, the final wavefunctions which the GRW theory attaches to the permitted and alternative final states of the pointer, one immediately realizes that Ψ 1 (X) and Ψ 2 (X) have a nonvanishing (even though extremely small) overlap and, in general, they are not exactly orthogonal.
5.2
The von Neumann dynamical model of measurement and, more generally the wavefunction of macrosystems.
This Section will be devoted to make clear why one has to keep quite distinct the measurement problem from the one of accounting for a macro-object having a precise location. Actually, von Neumann himself [8] , (as well as many other authors) has described the measurement process by making precise reference to a model in which the apparatus A is, once more, described by its centre-of-mass position variableX. The initial apparatus state, in the coordinate representation, is a Gaussian of width δ centred around the position X = 0:
Such a system interacts with the microscopic system S for which we are interested in determining the value of the observable O. One disregards the free motion both of the microsystem and of the apparatus and assumes the interaction between S and A to be governed by the following hamiltonian:
where γ is a coupling constant with the appropriate dimensions,Ω is the operator corresponding to O, andP is the momentum canonically conjugated to the position variableX. Let us assume that the interaction is switched on for a time interval T . The evolution, when the system S is in one of the two eigenstates ofΩ, is described by the relations:
where:
Then, if one assumes that γ(ω 2 − ω 1 )T ≫ δ one claims that "the fact that the final pointer position is around γω 1 T (γω 2 T ) tells us that the initial state of the system was |ω 1 (|ω 2 )". In other words, one has been able to devise an apparatus amplifying the initial microproperty of the system, correlating it to one of two macroscopically different locations of a macroscopic object.
In the considered formal description the quantum measurement problem consists in the fact that triggering the apparatus in the same initial state with the microstate:
yields a final entangled state involving the superposition of the states Ψ 1 (X, T ) and Ψ 2 (X, T ) of Eq.(23). We stress that neither von Neumann, nor all other scientists discussing this scheme, have ever considered as puzzling the appearance of the states Ψ 1 (X, T ) and Ψ 2 (X, T ) at the r.h.s. of Eq.(22) but only the occurrence of their superposition when the initial state of the system is the one given by (24) .
At this point it is appropriate to discuss in greater detail the basic features of a state like those of equation (23). For simplicity we will assume it to be centred around the origin, so that we will actually deal with the state (20). It is obvious that such a state, which in the case of an appropriately (on the relevant scale) small δ is interpreted by everybody as describing a pointer centred at X = 0, has the following properties:
-If we consider an arbitrarily large space interval (−D, D) and we call |in and |out two normalized states such that:
one has:
with:
Concluding: the state which everybody would associate to the assertion "the pointer points at 0" has exactly the same features of the state (1) of this paper i.e. of the state (4) of ref. [1] , the typical final state of the GRW theory, the one which, according to PJL, should have unacceptable implications. In particular, no matter how large is taken the "box" (−D, D), and how well localized is Ψ 0 (X) (i.e. how small is δ), the state attributes a non exactly zero probability to the pointer being found outside the "box".
It is to some extent amusing to remark that the criticism of PJL, which is directed against the GRW's proposal, when considered in the perspective we have just outlined, becomes an argument against the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. In fact, as we have pointed out, all supporters of this point of view including von Neumann himself plainly accept that the state (1) correspond to a precise location of the macroscopic pointer. On the other hand, within SQM the state (2) is certainly allowed and moreover it is stable and can persist for extremely long times (since the wavefunctions of macroscopic bodies spread very little), so that it is precisely against such a formalism that one could raise a criticism of the type of the one of ref. [1] .
It should be absolutely obvious that the situation presently discussed is not due to having chosen an inappropriate wavefunction to account for the situation "the pointer points at 0": it is simply an unavoidable consequence of the fact that, within SQM, no wavefunction can have a compact support in configuration space except that for a precise time instant t. In fact, for an isolated system, the wave function of the centre of mass obeys the Schrödinger equation for a free particle, implying that, even if at t = 0 its support is entirely contained in (−D, D), at any subsequent time it extends over the whole real axis.
The relevance of these remarks for the argument of PJL should be obvious: if he wants to stick strictly to the requirement that the final apparatus states are orthogonal, then he must assume that the only physical systems which are acceptable as measuring instruments are those for which "the pointer variable" has a discrete spectrum and whose initial state is driven in the closed linear manifolds 4 associated to different discrete eigenvalues according to the different microstates of S triggering the process. But such a request is certainly rather peculiar and does not correspond to any real measurement situation in our laboratories, and, as far as we know, to the ways in which our definite perceptions about macroscopic objects emerge.
A general theorem about measurements.
As previously stated, there are other, more formal and rigorous ways of proving that the requests of PJL cannot be satisfied, which are related to the so called Wigner-Araki-Yanase theorem [11, 12, 13, 14] putting precise limitations to the very possibility of ideal measurements for almost all observables. Here we will present them in the very sketchy way discussed in the introduction of ref. [13] . Let S be, as usual, the measured system and A the measuring apparatus. Let
be the eigenvalue equation for the observable of S we are interested in measuring. LetΓ =Γ (S) +Γ (A) be an additive conserved quantity for the composite system S + A, and U the unitary evolution operator describing the system-apparatus interaction. As already remarked, the assumption of ideality of the measurement can be expressed by the equation:
while the fact thatΓ is a conserved quantity implies:
One can then argue along the following lines:
The last line shows that A m ′ |A m = 0 for all m = m ′ implies m ′ |[Γ (S) ,M ]|m = 0, ∀m ′ , m, i.e., [Γ (S) ,M ] = 0. Therefore, the observableM of S must commute with the termΓ (S) of the additive conserved quantity. It goes without saying that even in the very elementary case of the measurement of the spin componentŜ z of a spin 1/2 particle, the ideal measurement scheme cannot hold because such a component does not commute with the spin componentŜ x , which is a term of a conserved additive quantity (i.e. the componentĴ x of the total angular momentum). In ref. [15] the most general proof of this theorem has been derived in a completely rigorous way also for the case of unbounded operators. Which lesson can we derive from the above analysis? Obviously, there are only two alternatives:
-Either the measurement is distorting (i.e. the final state of the system is different from the initial one and final states corresponding to initial orthogonal states are no longer orthogonal -at the r.h.s. of Eq. (30) |m has to be replaced by another state |m and it must hold m|m ′ = 0) but then the apparatus cannot be used to "prepare" a system and, at any rate, one cannot make precise claims about the properties possessed by the system after the measurement, in particular they may differ from those which have been revealed by the apparatus, -Or the final apparatus states cannot be orthogonal.
Actually, as it has been discussed, e.g., in [13, 15] , realistic measurement processes are both distorting and lead to non-mutually exclusive outcomes. It is also well known [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] that the amount of nonideality can be made arbitrarily small by making arbitrarily large, in the initial apparatus state, the mean value of the square of the conserved quantity. This nice feature is accepted by everybody as showing that the limitations induced by the presence of additive conserved quantities are not physically relevant and/or puzzling. This position contrasts with the author's absolutely strict request of ideality of the measurement.
Conclusions.
The conclusions of our analysis should be obvious: one can have many reasons to dislike dynamical reduction models and to prefer other ways to overcome the difficulties of SQM like, e.g., adopting the point of view of Bohmian Mechanics (see however the remarks in ref. [16] ), but certainly arguments like those put forward in ref. [1] have not to be taken into account in judging the appropriateness of the considered approach.
